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Licensing Strong NPIs 
 
Jon Gajewski 
 
1  Weak vs. Strong NPIs 
 
The goal of this paper is to give a perspicuous description of the difference 
in licensing conditions between weak and strong NPIs in English. 
(1) Weak NPIs:  any, ever 
(2) Strong NPIs:  Additive either 
   Punctual until 
   In weeks/months/years 
I will not be discussing minimizers, which are sometimes grouped with 
strong NPIs. See Heim (1984) and Lahiri (1998) among others for relevant 
discussion. 
The basic fact to be explained is that strong NPIs are licensed in a subset 
of the environments in which weak NPIs are licensed. There are two appar-
ent dimensions along which licensers of weak and strong NPIs differ: 
I. Negative Strength: among downward entailing (DE) operators, some are 
more negative than others (Zwarts 1998, von der Wouden 1997). The less 
negative do not license strong NPIs. 
(3) a. No one said anything. 
 b. No one has visited in years. 
(4) a. Not everyone said anything.   
b. *Not everyone has visited in years.   
c. Less than 3 students said anything. 
d. *Less then three students have visited in years. 
(5) [[  No one]]  ⇒ [[  Not every one]]  
II. Positivity: some licensers of weak NPIs have a positive component to 
their meanings (Atlas 1996, Horn 1996, a.o.). These “positive” licensers do 
not license strong NPIs. 
 
(6) a. Only Bill said anything. 
 b. *Only Bill has visited in weeks. 
(7) a. I’m sorry I said anything.  
 b. *I’m sorry I have visited in weeks. 
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(8) a. Only Bill left implies that Bill left. 
 b. I’m sorry I left implies that I left. 
These distinctions are generally treated differently in the theory of NPI-
licensing. In this paper, I will suggest that the two dimensions can be col-
lapsed into one, which will simplify the statement of NPI-licensing princi-
ples. 
 
1.1 Basic Proposal 
 
Negative Strength can be reduced to Positivity: negative expressions that are 
not strongest on their scale introduce positive implicatures that interfere with 
licensing. For example: 
(9) Not every implicates Some 
 No introduces no implicature 
 So, not every does not license strong NPIs 
2  Previous Solutions to the Two Problems 
 
2.1  Negative Strength: Zwarts (1998) 
 
I assume as background the Fauconnier/Ladusaw Hypothesis (FLH): 
(10) An NPI α is licensed only if it occurs in the scope of β,  
 where [[  β]]  is DE 
(11) Downward Entailing (DE) 
 A function f of type <σ, τ> is downward entailing (DE) iff 
 for all x, y of type σ such that x ⇒ y: f(y) ⇒ f(x). 
Zwarts added to FLH a condition that must be satisfied by strong NPIs. 
(12) A strong NPI α is licensed only if it occurs in the scope of β, 
where [[  β]]  is anti-additive  
(13) Anti-Additive (AA) 
 A function f of type <σ, τ> is anti-additive (AA) iff 
 for all x, y of type σ: f(x) ∧ f(y) ⇔ f(x ∨ y)  
Notice that if a function is AA then it is DE; consequently the functions that 
license strong NPIs are a subset of licensers of weak NPIs. In fact, (14) 
holds. 
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(14) F is Anti-Additive iff F is DE and F(A) ∧ F(B) ⇒ F(A ∨ B) 
(15) [[  no ]] , [[  never ]]  are AA 
(16) [[  few ]] , [[  less than n ]] , [[  not every ]]  are not AA 
A good split, all things considered, but there are problems. It is often ob-
served that non-AA operators can license strong NPIs. 
(17)   a. Few Americans have ever been to Spain. 
  Few Canadians have either.  (Nathan 1999) 
     b. He invited few peoplei until he knew she liked themi.       
 (de Swart 1996) 
 c. He was one of the few dogs I’d met in years that I really liked.    
       (Hoeksema 1996)  
Other problematic expressions: seldom, hardly ever/any, little. 
Is there a simple patch to Zwarts’s theory for these cases? A logical 
property intermediate between DE and AA? De Morgan’s laws don’t define 
any—but there’s no reason to feel beholden to them! (See below.) 
 
2.2  Positivity: von Fintel (1999), Horn (2002/2006) 
 
The problem here is a bit different, in that first we need to figure out why 
“positive” expressions license NPIs at all since they do not appear to be DE. 
(18)  Only Bill ate a vegetable. 
 #Therefore, only Bill ate cauliflower. 
An answer: the meanings of these licensers divide into two dimensions, 
one positive and one negative. The licensing condition is made sensitive to 
only one of the dimensions. I take von Fintel’s Strawson Entailment and 
Horn’s Assertoric Inertia to be two solutions of this kind (I will use von Fin-
tel as my representative example). 
(19) [[ only]]  (x) (P) is defined only if P(x) = True. 
 If defined, [[ only]]  (x) (P) = True iff ¬∃y≠x: P(y) = True 
(20) Strawson Entailment (⇒S)     
 a. For p, q of type t: p ⇒S q iff p = False or q = True. 
 b. For f, g of type <σ, τ>: f ⇒S g iff for all x of type σ such that g(x) 
is defined: f(x) ⇒S g(x). 
(21) Strawson Downward Entailing (SDE) 
 A function f of type <σ, τ> is Strawson-DE  
 iff for all x, y of type σ such that x ⇒ y: f(y) ⇒S f(x). 
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Given these definitions, [[  only Bill ]]   comes out SDE.   
(22) Only Bill ate a vegetable 
 Bill ate cauliflower 
 Therefore, only Bill ate cauliflower  [VALID] 
If we restate NPI-licensing conditions in terms of SDE we explain why only 
Bill licenses any and ever. 
(23) An NPI α is licensed only if it occurs in the scope of β, where [[ β]]  is 
SDE. 
2.2.1  Implications for the Licensing of Strong NPIs 
 
The question we will address now is whether we should state the licensing 
conditions of stong NPIs in terms of Strawson entailment, as well. As noted 
above, only Bill does not license strong NPIs. 
 
(24) *Only Bill likes WAFFLES, either. 
 *Only Bill has visited in weeks. 
 *Only Bill1 arrived until his1 birthday. 
 
What is the reason? Is [[  only Bill ]]  not Strawson AA? Or is it that Strawson 
entailment is not relevant to the licensing of strong NPIs? 
 
(25) Strawson Anti-Additive (SAA) 
 A function f of type <σ, τ> is Strawson-AA 
 iff f is SDE and for all x, y of type σ: f(x) ∧ f(y) ⇒S f(x ∨ y). 
(26) Only Bill drinks and Only Bill smokes 
 Therefore, only Bill drinks or smokes         (cf. Atlas 1996) 
 
The SDEness of [[ only Bill ]]  and the validity of (26) suggest that [[ only Bill ]]   
is Strawson AA (cf. Rullmann 2003). The same is true of other SDE opera-
tors investigated by von Fintel, such as regret and the antecedents of condi-
tionals—which also do not license strong NPIs.   
 
(27) I have never gone to Amsterdam. *If I go to BRUSSELS either, I   
 will buy you some chocolates.  (Rullmann 2003) 
(28) I didn’t go to Spain. *I regret that I went to Portugal, either. 
  (Rullmann 2003) 
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So, we must conclude that the licensing conditions of strong NPIs are stated 
in terms of standard entailment. For another view, see Atlas (1996) and 
Giannakidou (2006). 
 
2.3  Conclusion 
 
We have seen two separate stories that individually account well for the two 
contrasts between weak and strong NPIs. But the account is unsatisfying, 
since we account for a two-way contrast—weak vs. strong—with two differ-
ent settings of two independent parameters. 
 
 Entailment 
 Standard Strawsonian 
DE ??? weak NPIs 
AA strong NPIs ??? 
 
Is it possible to account for the difference between strong and weak with 
only one parameter? Also recall that there is some independent dissatisfac-
tion with Zwarts’s characterization of the licensers of strong NPIs. 
 
3  A New Analysis 
 
My proposal is that both weak and strong NPIs are looking for Downward 
Entailing licensers, but that they are looking for them at different levels. 
Weak NPIs only require a licenser that is DE in its truth conditions. Strong 
NPIs requires a licenser that is DE when the grammatical, non-truth-
conditional aspects of its meaning (presuppositions and scalar implicatures) 
are taken into account. 
 
3.1  Two Sources of Inspiration 
 
3.1.1  Krifka (1995) 
 
Krifka (1995) is also dissatisfied with Zwarts (1998) as a characterization of 
strong NPI licensers. Krifka introduces distinct semantics and pragmatics for 
weak and strong NPIs: 
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(29) Semantics: weak and strong NPIs introduce different sets of alterna-
tives into the computation. The alternatives to strong NPIs exclude 
marginal cases. 
 Pragmatics: the alternatives associated with weak and strong NPIs 
are exploited by different Assertion operators (ScalAssert vs. Em-
phAssert). 
 
However, as Krifka notes, even with such differences, a merely DE op-
erator would be sufficient to license a strong NPI. So, Krifka proposes an 
additional condition on strong NPIs: 
 
(30)  Strong NPIs are emphatic in nature. 
(31)  “Emphatic assertions tend to be emphatic ‘across the board’ ”. 
 (Krifka 1995:231) 
 
In order for a statement containing a strong NPI to be emphatic across the 
board, its licenser must be extreme in value with respect to its alternatives. 
Krifka points out that a nice consequence of this view is that what 
counts as an extreme value may vary from context to context, allowing near-
extremes like hardly any to license strong NPIs: 
 
(32) Hardly anyone had visited in weeks.  
 
I will attempt to say why specifically non-extreme licensers do not license 
strong NPIs. 
 
3.1.2  Chierchia (2004) 
 
Chierchia (2004), building on Krifka (1995), suggests that scalar implica-
tures may interfere with the licensing of (weak) NPIs. In particular, he offers 
a general account of intervention effects in NPI licensing. 
Chierchia generates for every constituent a plain meaning and a strong 
meaning. The strong meaning is the plain meaning augmented with its scalar 
implicatures. Chierchia then argues that it is strong meanings that are rele-
vant to NPI licensing. 
 
(33) *Bill didn’t give everyone anything. 
 NOT Bill gave EVERYone ANYthing. 
(34) Stronger Alternative to (33):  
 NOT Bill gave SOMEone ANYthing 
LICENSING STRONG NPIS 
 
169 
(35) Implicature (negation of stronger alternative): 
 NOT NOT Bill gave SOMEone ANYthing 
 “Bill gave someone something” 
(36) Strong Meaning: 
 (NOT Bill gave EVERYone ANYthing) AND  
 (Bill gave SOMEONE ANYthing) 
 
Note that the strong meaning no longer supports inferences from sets to sub-
sets. If for example, we replace thing in (36) with book, we do not obtain a 
sentence that follows from (36). 
 
(37)  Strong Meaning not DE since (36) does not entail, for example: 
(NOT Bill gave EVERYone ANYbook) AND  
(Bill gave SOMEONE ANYbook) 
 
This is, in essence, Chierchia’s explanation of why non-weak scalar items 
interfere with NPI licensing—they interfere with DEness.  
Chierchia is careful to formulate his analysis in such a way that cancel-
lation of the implicature that interferes with licensing does not ameliorate 
intervention effects. 
 
3.2  A Conservative Formalization 
 
In this section I formulate my own analysis of the weak/strong distinction. 
The guiding light for the analysis is the idea that non-truth-conditional mean-
ing is taken into account in the licensing of strong NPIs but not weak NPIs. I 
treat presuppositions as domain conditions on functions in the semantics. So, 
to neutralize their effect on weak NPIs I use Strawson entailment. For strong 
NPIs, I use standard entailment on meanings enriched with implicatures. I 
represent strong meanings with a covert only (cf. Fox 2003) 
  
(38)  a. [[  few]] ALT = { [[ no]] , [[ few]] ,  [[ not many]] , [[ not every]]  } 
b. [[ less than 3]] ALT = { … [[ less than 2]] , [[ less than 3]] ,  
 … [[ less than n]] …} 
(39) a. [[  α ]] ALT = [[  β ]] ALT([[  γ ]] )  
b. [[  few students ]] ALT = {[[ no student ]] , …[[ not every student]]  } 
(40)  Cross-categorial only (see Rooth 1985) 
(41)    [[ ONLY Q]] (C) =                (C is the set of alternatives to Q) 
λw.λP<e,t>. [[ Q]] w(P)=1  & ∀Q′∈C[ Q′ (w)(P)=1 →  
               ∀w′,P′ [ [[ Q]] w′(P′)=1 → Q′ (w′)(P′)=1] ] 
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 Licensing Principles: 
 
(42)  A weak NPI α is licensed only if it occurs in the scope of β, 
where [[ β]]  is SDE. 
(43)  A strong NPI α is licensed only if it occurs in the scope of β, 
where [[ ONLY β]] ([[ β]] ALT) is DE. 
 
 
(44) [[  ONLY no students]] ([[ no students]] ALT) = [[  no students ]]  
(45) [[  ONLY not every student]] ([[ not every student]] ALT) =  
 [[  many students but not every student ]]  
 
An analysis that separates truth conditions and presuppositions into 
separate dimensions of meaning (Karttunen & Peters 1979, Horn 2002) 
would allow both licensing conditions to be stated in terms of standard en-
tailment. 
 
3.3  Implication for Intervention 
 
Note that the licensing condition on weak NPIs does not make use of strong 
meanings. Consequently, we lose Chierchia’s account of intervention. 
Recall, though, that Chierchia (2004) needs to ignore certain implica-
tures in the licensing of weak NPIs. DE expressions like not many have im-
plicatures of their own. 
 
(46)  Not many students left 
Strong meaning: Not many students left and some students left. 
 
To prevent these implicatures from interfering with licensing, Chierchia 
draws a distinction between direct and indirect implicatures. 
Indirect implicatures are implicatures introduced by reversal at DE 
nodes. Chierchia claims that only these interfere with NPI licensing. We 
might attempt to incorporate this distinction into our story: 
 
(47)  Entailments, Indirect Implicatures vs.  
 Direct Implicatures, Presupposition 
 
Another option: adopt a different, perhaps syntactic, view of intervention. 
Some have argued that intervention in NPI licensing should be seen as part 
of a broader phenomenon (e.g. Beck effects). See Guerzoni (to appear) for a 
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recent view of this kind. It’s not clear how Chierchia’s proposal could extend 
to other cases of intervention. 
 
3.4  Extension to Other Cases & Potential Problems 
 
3.4.1  Quantifiers that Typically Induce Implicatures and Sometimes 
License Strong NPIs 
  
Recall the observation that negative expressions such as few, hardly any/ever 
and little are also capable of licensing strong NPIs. These are not scalar end-
points. 
To account for their behavior, I borrow another idea from 
Krifka/Chierchia: scale truncation. Under certain exceptional contextual 
conditions, an expression near an endpoint can count as an endpoint. 
 
(48) NO <FEW, NOT MANY, NOT EVERY> 
 
Chierchia 2004: “What enables us to truncate a scale at the low end […] is 
that small amounts may be functionally equivalent to nothing.” Chierchia 
notes that sentence such as (49) need not carry implicatures. 
 
(49)  Typically, few students in my class take an interest in semantics. 
 
This is a bit vague though; let me propose a precise restriction on when a 
negative operator can act like a strong scalar endpoint. 
 
(50)  Condition on Truncation: to be able to act as a strong scalar end-
point a scalar item must be close enough to the endpoint. 
 
I propose that to be considered “close enough” a scalar item must be Intoler-
ant (see Löbner 1985, Horn 1989). 
 
(51) A function f of type <<e,t>,t> is Intolerant iff  
if f is not trivial1, then for all x of type <e,t>, f(x)=0 or  f(¬x)=0.  
 
On its proportional reading, few is plausibly Intolerant. Fewer than 4 is not. 
 
                                                 
1A function f is trivial iff for all x, f(x)=1 or for all x, f(x)=0. I include this 
clause to bring out the inclusion relations in (54). See Appendix for proof that 
AA⊆DE+Intolerant. 
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(52) a. #Few of my friends are linguists and few of them aren’t.         
b. #He rarely goes to church and he rarely doesn’t go. (Horn 1989) 
(53)  Fewer than 4 of my friends are linguists and fewer than 4 aren’t. 
 
Someone unconvinced by my story might still be interested in DE+Intolerant 
as an intermediate category of negation between DE and AA. 
 
(54) AA ⊂ DE+Intolerant ⊂ DE 
 
I find support for this condition in the inability of cardinal few to license 
strong NPIs. 
 
(55) There were few potatoes in the pantry. 
 ??There were few in the refrigerator, either. 
 
3.4.2  Quantifiers that seem not to Induce Implicatures but do not         
          License Strong NPIs: DE Comparative Quantifiers 
 
Krifka (1999) and Fox and Hackl (2006) argue that more than n quantifiers 
do not give rise to scalar implicatures.   
 
(56) More than 3 students left early.  
 Does not implicate: It’s not true that 5 students left early. 
 
Krifka also makes this claim for negative comparative quantifiers, such as 
less than/at most n. If this is true, this is a problem since these quantifiers are 
DE. I would predict they license strong NPIs, contrary to fact. 
 
(57) Less than 3 students left early. 
 Claim: No implicature 
 
(58) Less than 3 students wrote on phonology. 
 *Less than 3 wrote on SEMANTICS, either. 
 
Fortunately, the claim that DE comparative quantifiers introduce no im-
plicature is less plausible than it is in the UE case. Krifka (1999) acknowl-
edges that sentences like (57) typically give rise to an existential inference, 
which he analyzes as a presupposition. He supports this with evidence from 
anaphora. 
 
(59) ?Less than 3 students left early.  
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 And they only left because they felt ill. 
 
I am not convinced this is a presupposition. Consider the following tests. 
 
(60)  a. ?Hey wait a minute! I had no idea some students left early. 
b. Mary wants less than 3 students to walk out on her talk. 
 
I believe it is a weak implicature. But if Fox and Hackl are correct, (61) 
holds. 
 
(61) [[  ONLY less than 3 students ]] (P) =  ⊥ 
 
I suggest that if strengthening operator ONLY produces inconsistency, a 
weaker one steps in to generate an existential implicature. 
 
(62) [[ W-ONLY Q]] (C) =                     (C is the set of alternatives to Q) 
λw.λP<e,t>. [[ Q]] w(P)=1 & ∃Q’∈C[ Q’(w)(P)=0 ] 
 
We also note that DE comparative quantifiers are not Intolerant, so may per-
haps never qualify as strong to serve as a strong scalar endpoint, except pos-
sibly in one case.  
 
3.4.3  Less than one/zero  
 
A problem that haunts semantic accounts of strong NPI licensing: 
 
(63) a. [[  no ]]  = [[  fewer than one ]]  = [[  zero ]]  
 b. *Fewer than one student has visited in weeks/either. 
 
My theory does no better than an AA theory here, since fewer than one stu-
dent does not intuitively give rise to such an existential implicature. 
Possible response: follow Fox and Hackl in assuming all measurement 
domains are dense. The system will produce an implicature like “.3 students 
left” but the implicature doesn’t see the light of day once it confronts our 
world knowledge about counting students. Fine for fewer than one, but will 
not work for zero. 
Suppose the grammar (and implicature-generating mechanism as a part 
of it) can’t distinguish one numeral from another. The grammar knows de-
gree domains are ordered and possibly dense but doesn’t know the names of 
degrees. Functions like [[ zero students]]  are intuitively DE (even AA), do not 
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give rise to positive implicatures, but do not license strong NPIs. The gram-
mar sees zero as just another number, like sixty-four. 
(64) Zero students left early 
 No/*Zero students like SEMANTICS, either. 
(65) a. On no/*zero occasion(s) did he mention my help. (cf. Deprez 1999) 
 b. No/*Zero students but Bill came.  (cf. Moltmann 1995) 
 c. She drank no/*zero martinis, not even weak ones. (cf. Postal 2004) 
(66) ?Zero students said anything. 
I argued for Intolerance as a line dividing DE quantifiers that could act as 
endpoints from those that could not. Explicit proportionals like (67) are a 
problem.  
(67) *Less than 1/3 of the students have visited in weeks. 
Perhaps, grammar is not good at working out explicit proportions. Fox 
(2000) argues for a similar conclusion, given the possibility of wide scope in 
(68a)—apparently violating economy conditions. 
(68) a. Rob doesn’t speak more than half of the 9 languages spoken   
in Sydney.   (Fox 2000) 
b. Rob doesn’t speak 5 of the 9 languages spoken in Sydney. 
Tentative conjecture: the grammar cannot ascribe different grammatical 
properties to expressions because they contain different numerals. 
 
4  Conclusions 
 
• Both weak and strong NPIs seek DE licensers. Weak NPIs look for 
them in the truth conditions. Strong NPIs are forced to take presup-
positions and implicatures into account when assessing DEness. 
• A non-scalar endpoint can sometimes act as a scalar endpoint in 
context if it is Intolerant and can, therefore, license strong NPIs. 
• DE comparative quantifiers do give rise to scalar implicatures and 
thus cannot license strong NPIs. 
• Less than 1/3 and zero may not be counterexamples to the theory, if 
we are correct that grammars cannot ascribe properties such as In-
tolerance to a phrase based on the identity of a numeral.  
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Appendix: Proof that AA ⊆ DE+Intolerant 
Assume f is AA. 
Suppose f is not trivial, i.e., ∃x f(x)=1 & ∃x f(x)=0. 
Now suppose for reductio that f(a)=1 & f(¬a)=1 for arbitrary a. 
Notice that a ∨ ¬a = U, that is, the top element in the domain. 
Since f is AA it follows that f(a ∨ ¬a) = f(U) =1 
But, being AA, f is DE so for all y, such that y⇒U, f(y)=1 
But all y are such that y ⇒U, so for all y, f(y)=1 
(This contradicts our assumption that f is not trivial) 
So, for all z, f(z)=0 or f(¬z)=0. 
Therefore, f is Intolerant. 
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